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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
SAMARI PRENTICE WINN, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
          NO. 44345 
 
          Ada County Case No.  
          CR-FE-2014-6665 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Winn failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
aggregate sentence of life, with 40 years fixed, upon his convictions for two counts of aiding and 
abetting first degree murder and one count of aiding and abetting attempted first degree murder? 
 
 
Winn Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
 The state charged Winn with two counts of aiding and abetting first degree murder and 
one count of aiding and abetting attempted first degree murder based on his involvement in the 
murders of Elliott Bailey and Travonte Calloway, and the attempted murder of Jeanette Juraska.  
(R., pp.90-92, 292-94.)  The jury found Winn guilty as charged (R., p.402), and the district court 
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imposed concurrent unified sentences of life, with 40 years fixed, for both of the aiding and 
abetting first degree murder convictions, and a concurrent fixed 15-year sentence for the aiding 
and abetting attempted first degree murder conviction (R., pp.405-08).  Winn filed a notice of 
appeal, timely from the entry of judgment.  (R., pp.411-15, 426-31.) 
Winn argues his sentence is excessive in light of his purported “remorse for the victims 
and his lesser culpability of the alleged crimes.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6.)  The record 
supports the sentence imposed.   
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of 
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.  State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008).  It is presumed 
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement.  State 
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007).  Where a sentence is within statutory 
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.  
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted).  To carry this burden the appellant 
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  Id.  A sentence is 
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and 
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.  Id.  The 
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when 
deciding upon the sentence.  Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of 
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation).  “In 
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where 
reasonable minds might differ.”  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens, 
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146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).  Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits 
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial 
court.”  Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).  
Aiding and abetting first degree murder carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 
indeterminate life, with 10 years fixed, and a maximum sentence of fixed life.  I.C. §§ 18-204, 
18-4004 .  The maximum penalty for aiding and abetting attempted first degree murder is 15 
years fixed.  I.C. §§ 18-204, 18-306(1), 18-4004.  Winn’s concurrent sentences of life, with 40 
years fixed, for two counts of aiding and abetting first degree murder and 15 years fixed for one 
count of aiding and abetting attempted first degree murder fall squarely within the limits 
prescribed by statute.  (R., pp.405-08.)  Contrary to Winn’s assertions on appeal, the sentences 
are also reasonable in light of the seriousness of the offenses and Winn’s role in them, his 
unwillingness to accept responsibility for his actions, and his long history of criminal behavior. 
Winn played an instrumental role in the murders and attempted murder of which he was 
convicted in this case.  In October 2013, someone stole approximately 30 pounds of marijuana 
from Anthony Robins.  (Tr., p.888, L.18 – p.894, L.20.)  Robins was Winn’s drug supplier, and 
both Robins and Winn were “certain” that Winn’s “good friends,” Travonte Calloway and Elliot 
Bailey, had stolen Robins’ marijuana.  (Tr., p.883, L.2 – p.884, L.6, p.896, Ls.21-25, p.898, L.7 
– p.900, L.16.)  When Robins later recruited John Douglas to “handle the situation” with 
Travonte and Elliot, Winn facilitated the plan by picking Douglas up from the airport, housing 
him for several days, showing him where Travonte and Elliot lived, and helping him load the 
murder weapon.  (Tr., p.901, Ls.6-21, p.905, L.9 – p.914, L.7).  On the night of the murders, 
Winn set a trap for Travonte and Elliot by making plans to go out with them to celebrate 
Travonte’s birthday. (Tr., p.403, L.16 – p.404, L.12, p.409, L.17 – p.414, L.11, p.917, L.18 – p. 
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918, L.10.)  When Winn arrived at Travonte’s apartment at the predetermined time, Douglas 
entered the apartment behind him and shot Travonte, Elliot, and Jeanette Juraska multiple times.  
(Tr., p.417, L.25 – p.433, L.23.) 
Winn argues on appeal that his sentence is excessive because he “was the least culpable 
actor compared to the other individuals involved with the shooting.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.5.)  
While it is true, as Winn contends, that Winn did not personally shoot the victims or provide the 
gun, ammunition or getaway vehicle (see id.), Winn actively assisted the shooter in a number of 
ways, including by showing the shooter where the victims lived, donning gloves and helping the 
shooter load the murder weapon with hollow point bullets, “put[ting] himself out there to find 
out where [the victims] were going to be” on the night of the murders, and making sure the 
victims would be home when he accompanied the shooter to their apartment (Tr., p.403, L.16 – 
p.404, L.12, p.409, L.17 – p.414, L.11, p.901, Ls.6-21, p.905, L.9 – p.914, L.7, p.917, L.18 – p. 
918, L.10).  Winn claims it is mitigating that he “was not involved in the dispute between” 
Robins and the victims, and he argues it was Robins, not he, who “wanted to retaliate for the 
stolen marijuana.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.5.)  The record, however, belies both claims.  The 
testimony at trial established that, although it was Robins’ marijuana that was stolen, Winn took 
the theft personally and believed the victims were profiting from the stolen marijuana and were 
spending money that would otherwise have belonged to Robins, Anton Raider, and himself.  
(Tr., p.898, L.21 – p.900, L.21.)  While Robins may have come up with the plan to have the 
victims killed, it was Winn, not Robins, who ultimately ensnared the victims and facilitated the 
shooter’s access to them.  (Tr., p.409, L.17 – p.414, L.11, p.417, L.25 – p.420, L.9, p.426, Ls.14-
17.)  That he did so despite having no personal dispute with the victims is, as found by the 
district court, an aggravating circumstance, not a mitigating one.  (See Tr., p.1337, Ls.8-11.) 
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Despite the jury verdicts finding him guilty, Winn has consistently failed to admit or take 
any responsibility for his roles in the murders and attempted murder of his victims.  He asserts on 
appeal that “his statements at sentencing showed he felt remorse for the victims” (Appellant’s 
brief, p.5 (citing Tr., p.1322, Ls.18-19, p.1333, Ls.6-12)), but the statements to which he refers 
constitute only nine lines out of a 14-page allocution (see Tr., p.1321, L.6 – p.1335, L.1), during 
which Winn’s primary focus appears to have been attempting to persuade the district court that 
the witnesses against him lied (Tr., p.1321, L.6 – p.1324, L.8, p.1329, L.1 – p.1332, L.6), that 
being under the influence of alcohol was “the only wrong thing [he] did” the night of the 
murders (Tr., p.1327, Ls.2-4), and that he was “charged with something that [he] didn’t do” (Tr., 
p.1334, Ls.1-14).  Winn also chose to not participate in the presentence investigation or GAIN 
evaluation.  (See PSI, pp.5, 9-14, 16.)  Although it was Winn’s constitutional right to make that 
choice, his decision to deprive the district court of any information (aside from his repeated 
denials of responsibility) left the court without any basis to determine whether Winn is amenable 
to rehabilitation.  And, in fact, a review of the record the district court did have shows he is not. 
Winn has a long criminal history which includes juvenile adjudications for receiving 
stolen property and escape, misdemeanor convictions for driving under the influence (two 
separate convictions) and fighting, and three prior felony drug-related convictions.  (PSI, pp.6-9.)  
It appears he moved to Idaho in 2012 or 2013, after serving four years in Fulsom Prison.  (PSI, 
pp.8-9.)  Less than two years later, Winn committed the crimes of which he was convicted in this 
case.  (PSI, p.8.)  While in custody on the charges, Winn received “multiple write ups and 
disciplinary actions for,” among other things, “refusing to obey orders, disrespect and/or threats 
of physical harm to staff,” and “interfering with staff duties.”  (PSI, p.9.)   
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Although Winn claimed at sentencing that he “tried to come [to Idaho] to live better” 
(Tr., p.1323, Ls.4-7), his actions show that he has been either unwilling or unable to live a law-
abiding life.  As he apparently had in California (see PSI, pp.6-7, 9), Winn made a living in 
Idaho by selling drugs for profit (Tr., p.883, L.2 – p.884, L.6, p.886, L.25 – p.887, L.15, p.898, 
L.21 – p.900, L.16).  Winn did not stop at drug trafficking, however.  Rather, as found by the 
district court, Winn “involved [himself] in the planning and the execution of two people and the 
attempted execution of another to protect the drug trade that [he] had developed here in Boise.”  
(Tr., p.1337, Ls.12-15.) 
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court specifically considered the goals 
of sentencing, noting that its primary consideration was the protection of society.  (Tr., p.1335, 
Ls.7-17.)  The court recognized but rejected Winn’s protestations of innocence, finding Winn’s 
“involvement” in the murders and attempted murder “was clear” and noting the jury “found 
unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] had been involved instrumentally in each one 
of these crimes.”  (Tr., p.1136, L.12 – p.1337, L.1.)  The court indicated it was sentencing Winn 
for the conduct of which he was convicted and, in doing so, found: 
It’s clear that your involvement was not as a reckless person, and, in fact, your 
lack of trying to stop or remove yourself from the crime, was devoid of the fact 
that these were truly your friends.  So this is obviously an execution for hire that 
came about because of the criminal enterprise of drug trafficking, and it wasn’t 
even your affront that caused the situation in the first place.   
 
(Tr., p.1337, Ls.2-11.)  The court also considered and commented on the lifelong impact Winn’s 
crimes would have on the surviving victim and the deceased victims’ families.  (Tr., p.1337, 
Ls.15-19.) 
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably determined 
that a lengthy prison sentence was warranted based on the seriousness of the offenses and 
--
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Winn’s culpability.  The sentence is also reasonable based on Winn’s continued denials of 
responsibility and his extensive criminal history.  Given any reasonable view of the facts, Winn 
has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Winn’s convictions and sentences. 
       
 DATED this 11th day of October, 2017. 
 
 
 
      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming__________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11th day of October, 2017, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to: 
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      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General    
 
